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Ay Dios NSMIA!

1

PROOF OF A PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION SHOULD
NOT BE A PRECONDITION FOR PREEMPTING BLUE SKY
LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS IMPROVEMENT ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, both federal and state securities law have
governed the purchase and sale of securities since 1933.2 This two-tiered
regulatory scheme is often criticized for being unnecessarily complex
and redundant, inefficient, and expensive for issuers.3 “Issuers,” such as
large corporations, small business owners, and investment companies,
typically sell securities, like stocks and bonds, in order to raise capital for
business growth or investment. In order to sell securities to the general
public, issuers must typically comply with multifarious registration
requirements. Such requirements include submitting securities
registration forms, financial disclosures, and fees to state regulatory
agencies and the federal Securities Exchange Commission (“S.E.C.” or
“Commission”).4 Even if issuers comply, some states refuse to allow the

1

NSMIA refers to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act and is pronounced
“NIZ.mee.uh.” Jed Horowitz, No More Blue Skies? Lawyers Are Scrambling for New Angles,
ONWALLSTREET.COM, Sept. 1, 1998 (on file with author).
2
The Securities Act of 1933 introduced federal securities regulation to a securities
market already regulated by state securities law. See infra Part II.
3
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920 (“[T]he system of dual Federal and state securities regulation has resulted in a
degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation. Securities offerings and the brokers and dealers
engaged in securities transactions are all currently subject to a dual system of regulation that, in
many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit
Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (1987) (“The
federal-state-[Securities Self-Regulatory Organization] system of securities regulation does not have
a well articulated allocation of responsibilities and priorities. It involves conflicting philosophies and
considerable overlap and duplication.”).
4
See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional
Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 185 (1997) (“Immediately prior to [NSMIA], [state
securities] laws generally required that securities offered . . . within a particular state must be
registered with the state’s securities division . . . . This broad rule, of course, is duplicative of the
fundamental registration rule in the 1933 Act.”). Examples of current securities registration forms
include New York’s form M-11 for non-exempt securities or Form 99 for exempt securities under
NSMIA. INVESTOR PROTECTION BUREAU, INDEX OF INVESTOR FORMS BY CATEGORY,
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ investors/form_categ.html. Each form includes a schedule of fees to be
paid. Id.
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sale of securities that do not meet minimum quality or merit standards.5
The process of complying with these registration and merit requirements
can become prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller issuers.6
In October 1996, Congress—drawing upon its constitutional
authority to preempt state law7—abrogated some of the states’ regulatory
authority over securities by enacting the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act (“NSMIA”).8 Congress intended to streamline the
regulation of national securities markets by federalizing the registration
and regulation of several types of securities, like those listed on national
securities exchanges.9 NSMIA also preempts state securities laws
regulating certain private offerings of securities already exempt from
federal registration.10 However, such an innovative solution for securities
markets did not develop without a concomitant set of novel complexities.
Issuers selling securities in “private offerings” (also called
“private placements”) lack clear instruction as to when, and under what
circumstances, they are no longer obligated to comply with state
securities regulations. Unless NSMIA specifically exempts a class of
securities from state regulation, state regulation of those securities is not
preempted and continues to bind issuers.11 Securities qualifying for the
5

For example, state merit standards could disallow the sale of securities if the price
were too high, if the underwriter fees or costs of sale were too high, or if purchasers’ voting rights
would not have parity with voting rights of other classes of shareholders. See MERIT STANDARDS
FOR SECURITIES OFFERINGS (Ohio Dep’t of Commerce), available at http://www.securities.state.oh.us/
Rules/Existing_Guidelines.aspx#DS (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
6
See Campbell, supra note 4, at 181. In addition to registration fees charged by the
state, an issuer’s expenses include “legal and accounting costs generated by extensive narrative and
financial disclosure requirements in a registered offering.” Id. at n.32.
7
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution permits Congress to preempt
state law simply by regulating the same subject matter. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Cheryl
Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. Securities Regulatory
Framework: A Lesson From Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 396 (2006)
(summarizing the role of the Supremacy Clause in preemption of state securities law). State law is
automatically “preempted,” and is subverted to federal law, wherever a conflict exists between state
and federal law. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“The Supremacy Clause
unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall
prevail . . . . It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is ‘superior to that of the
States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those
necessities may be.”) (citation omitted).
8
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (hereinafter “NSMIA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006)).
9
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A); see H.R. REP. 104-622, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, at 3878
(1996) (stating that the purpose of NSMIA is to “designat[e] the Federal government as the
exclusive regulator of national offerings of securities”). National securities exchanges include larger
exchanges like New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A).
10
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D); see H.R. REP. 104-622, supra note 9, at 3895 (“The
Committee intends that the [Securities Act of 1933] section 4(2) exemption from State regulation
facilitate private placement of securities consistent with the public interest and the protection of
investors.”).
11
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (limiting the scope of preemption by leaving states the
authority to regulate offerings of securities that are completely intra-state); H.R. REP. 104-622, supra
note 9, at 3878 (“State governments generally retain authority to regulate small, regional, or
intrastate securities offerings, and to bring actions pursuant to State laws and regulations prohibiting
fraud and deceit, including broker-dealer sales practices abuses.”); see also Campbell, supra note 4,
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federal Rule 506 “private offering” exemption comprise one category of
securities that NSMIA exempts from state securities laws.12 However, the
complexity and fragility of a Rule 506 exemption render it unworkable
as a basis for preempting state law.
Rule 506 of Regulation D—one of several, objective exemption
rules issued in the 1980s under the Securities Act of 1933—provides a
regulatory exemption from federal registration for any offer of securities
that is “non-public,” or “private.”13 An “exemption” is valuable to issuers
because it excuses the issuer from the expensive and complex
registration and disclosure processes involved in public offerings of
securities.14 Private offerings were exempt from federal registration
before NSMIA was enacted, but they were not necessarily exempt from
state registration and merit regulation.15 NSMIA now preempts state
regulation of Rule 506 private offerings.16
Although Rule 506 provides an objective standard for securing a
private offering exemption under the Securities Act,17 it provides an
unreasonably complex and untenable standard for preempting state
securities regulation. More than a decade following the passage of
NSMIA, courts have yet to agree whether an issuer claiming a Rule 506
exemption must prove the exemption in order to demonstrate that
NSMIA has preempted state law.18 Resolving this issue is important to
issuers because Rule 506 creates an elusive and mercurial exemption,
one that may become invalid months after the securities are offered for
sale without regard for state regulation.19 If state law is automatically
revived after a private offering exemption is lost, states would regain
at 204-05 (Although certain smaller offerings may be exempt from federal registration under
Regulation A and Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, NSMIA does not preempt state regulation of
these offerings.).
12
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006) (providing a registration exemption for offers of securities
“not involving any public offering”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2008) (providing to issuers a “safe
harbor” for engaging in private offers of securities, criteria that, if met, would guarantee an
exemption from registration under § 4(2) of the Securities Act).
13
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Private offers of securities include offers to
banks, investment companies, wealthy individuals, and other financially sophisticated and accredited
investors. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 506 (2008) (defining a class of “accredited investors” to whom
issuers could offer securities while maintaining an exemption from federal registration). For a
discussion of the Regulation D rules and § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, see infra Part III(A).
14
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
15
See Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“Until 1996,
both federal and state regulations governed securities offerings.”).
16
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
17
The requirements for a private offering exemption under The Securities Act of 1933
are highly subjective. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
18
1 STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING
COMPANIES § 6:24.50 (2007); see 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4).
19
In one case, a trial court found that two separate offers two months apart were legally
“integrated,” or treated as a single offer. See Reply Brief of Appellants Christopher C. Brown &
Funeral.com, Inc., at 24, Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, No. A06-1233 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007), 2006 WL 4723912. This means that the issuer lost its valid Rule 506 exemption on the
first offer after making the second non-exempt offer. Id.
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jurisdiction to impose remedies for securities violations ex post. The
vestige of state regulatory authority over securities obfuscates the private
placement issuer’s duties and liabilities under state law.
This Note evaluates the two preemption standards adopted under
differing judicial interpretations of NSMIA. The “broad” preemption
standard does not require an issuer to prove a valid Rule 506 exemption
in order to claim an exemption from state law under NSMIA. This
standard was first adopted by a federal district court in Temple v.
Gorman and was most recently reaffirmed by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc.20 The “narrow” preemption
standard requires proof of a valid Rule 506 exemption before a court will
preempt state law under NSMIA. The narrow standard was first iterated
by the Alabama Supreme Court in Buist v. Time Domain Corp. and was
recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v.
Earthboard Sports USA, Inc.21 The S.E.C. can best resolve this issue by
adopting a safe harbor that would guarantee issuers an exemption from
state securities regulation upon filing a notice of the exempt offering
with the state.
Part II of this Note provides the relevant statutory context for
these decisions. It begins by illustrating the development and
disintegration of the dual regulatory system. Part III provides two
relevant examples of policy changes attempting to rebalance investor
protections with regulatory efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity:
Regulation D NSMIA. Part IV examines the practical consequences of
these judicial interpretations of NSMIA by reviewing case law. Finally,
Part V concludes that a broader standard is more consistent with the
intent of Congress and can add efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity to
securities regulation.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUAL-REGULATORY SYSTEM

The term “dual-regulatory system” refers, in this context, to the
two levels of regulatory agencies governing the purchase and sale of
securities in the United States.22 The two-tiered system is the result of the
independent developments of state and federal securities laws in the 19th
and early 20th centuries.23 The following sections discuss the evolution
20
733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44;
accord Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087
(D. Minn. 2006); Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1116 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
21
481 F.3d 901, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007); Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So.2d 290,
298 (Ala. 2005); accord In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App.
2006); Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006); Hamby v.
Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
22
Karmel, supra note 3, at 107.
23
See generally Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards
Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 651-52
(1982) (summarizing the history of federal and state securities law enactments).
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of federal and state regulation of securities in the United States, which
provides the historical underpinnings of Regulation D and NSMIA.
A.

Blue Sky Law

Securities regulation and investor protection are old concepts
predating the United States. The Bubble Act of 1720 in Britain is one
early example of an investor protection law, which purported to protect
investors by outlawing certain fraudulent activities of large merchants.24
By the time Congress passed the first federal securities law in 1933,25
state legislatures had long assumed a role in securities regulation, some
since the mid-19th century.26 Like the Bubble Act, the first securities and
commodities regulations came about at a time when highly speculative
and fraudulent investment offers had spread ubiquitously in the United
States.27 This urged state legislatures to pass laws and regulations
protecting investors from fraudulent and high-risk securities.28
In 1911, Kansas became the first state to enact such securities
laws, which became known as “blue sky” laws.29 Blue sky laws are
primarily intended to curb securities fraud.30 They also promote
dissemination of information to investors by providing for mandatory
disclosures.31 The Kansas statute established registration requirements for
all offers of securities and licenses for all firms selling securities.32
Registration of securities involved filing a copy of the security, along
24

Jeffrey T. Haughey & Kevin M. Veler, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes:
New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 693-94 (1982). The Bubble Act
responded to wild fluctuations in the market price of British and French merchant companies, a
financial crisis attributed to the companies’ sales of subscriptions in fraudulent enterprises. See id.
25
Id. at 697.
26
See Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts
Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005) (citing
Massachusetts law regulating the minimum par value of railroad company shares as of 1852).
Commodities exchanges had also been regulated since the 19th century in reaction to
speculative trading. Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86
NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1013-14 (1992).
27
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 347, 355 (1991) (“The public’s growing appetite for speculative securities sparked intense
public concern about fraudulent promotions.”); Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation
of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 792 (1986) (“[The early blue sky laws] reflected,
primarily, a strong sense of the ordinary person’s vulnerability to securities fraud.”).
28
Hazen, supra note 26, at 1013-14; Lane, supra note 26, at 321.
29
Sargent, supra note 27, at 791, 792 n.34. A “blue sky law” refers to “[a] state statute
establishing standards for offering and selling securities, the purpose being to protect citizens from
investing in fraudulent schemes or unsuitable companies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed.
2004). The precise origin of the term “blue sky” is debatable, but the term is commonly believed to
refer to speculative and fraudulent sales of the “blue sky” to gullible investors. Hazen, supra note 26,
at 1020 n.180; but see Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 359 n.59 (arguing that “blue sky” was used
commonly in 1910, but no one using it ever defined it, so Kansans probably used the term to refer to
other speculative or fraudulent activity before using it with respect to securities).
30
Hazen, supra note 26, at 1014.
31
See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 394-95.
32
See id. at 359-62.
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with copies of financial statements and business plans, with the state
banking commissioner.33 Blue sky laws also required periodic financial
reports and disclosures for any firm offering or selling securities in
Kansas.34
Merit review was also a significant feature of Kansas’ first blue
sky law.35 Merit review refers to the state’s ability to deny intra-state
sales of securities for a variety of reasons, like if the offer contains unfair
terms, if the security does not promise a fair return, or if the issuer is
insolvent or dishonest.36 Kansas empowered the bank commissioner to
perform stringent merit reviews for securities sold within the state in
order to stem the proliferation of unscrupulous businesses cozening
ignorant investors out of their money.37
By 1913, twenty-four states had adopted blue sky laws,38 and
many states copied the Kansas statute in adopting merit review.39 In
1917, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
these laws, finding that they fell within the states’ police powers.40
Today, every state has adopted some form of blue sky law.41 Most blue
sky laws are modeled after the Uniform Securities Act,42 a model code
attempting to harmonize differences in early state securities regulations.43
Only a minority of states stringently enforces merit reviews.44

33

See id. at 361.
See id. at 359-62.
35
Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 696.
36
See, e.g., id. at 802-05 (discussing several of the bases on which states deny intra-state
offers and sales of securities).
37
Id. at 696 (noting that, under the 1911 Kansas blue sky merit regulations the bank
commissioner approved only 100 of the 1400 to 1500 applications received in the first year and a
half).
38
Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 696.
39
Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 377-78. The other states adopting strict merit
requirements were Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and West Virginia, primarily agrarian states without the investment banking activity found in states
that rejected merit requirements. Id. at 377-80.
40
See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 586 (1917) (“[T]he judgment is for
the State to make, and in the belief of evils and the necessity for their remedy and the manner of
their remedy the State has determined that the business of dealing in securities shall have
administrative supervision, and 26 states have expressed like judgments.”); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 568 (1917) (deferring to the Court’s decision in Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co.); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 555 (1917) (“Whatever detriment may come from
such [speculative] judgments the law may be powerless to prevent; but against counterfeits of value
the law can give protection, and such is the purpose of the [“blue sky”] statute under review.”); see
also Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 387 (noting that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s holdings
in the “Blue Sky Cases” of 1917 states were to free to regulate securities without issue as to the
constitutionality of such legislation or regulation).
41
See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 702.
42
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (2005).
43
See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 702.
44
Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 389.
34
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Federal Securities Regulation

Congress did not begin regulating securities or securities markets
until 1933, during the Great Depression.45 In a series of congressional
hearings held on the 1933 Securities Act, Congress recognized that state
regulators had failed to prevent the stock market crash in 1929.46 The
stock market crash was exacerbated by speculative investments and gross
over-valuations of worthless securities, which blue sky laws were
supposed to prevent.47 States had limited jurisdiction, however, in that
they were unable to effectively regulate interstate securities
transactions.48 Additionally, some states performed their delegated
regulatory functions more efficaciously than others.49
The 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
serve primarily to police securities fraud and promote the full disclosure
and distribution of material information to the market.50 Congress did not
adopt the merit regulations present in many blue sky laws, but instead
adopted a policy of full disclosure to protect investors.51
The disclosure rules contained in the Securities and Exchange
Acts, however, are far more voluminous and demanding than the
disclosures required by most blue sky laws modeled after the Uniform
Securities Act.52 The purpose of disclosure is to provide information to
investors. A fully informed investor is believed to be able to protect
himself or herself from potential risks and fraud better than the
government.53 Justice Louis Brandeis famously summarized this theory
of disclosure when he wrote that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”54
Despite the failures of blue sky laws and the addition of federal
regulations, the Securities Act, as originally drafted, preserved the states’
concurrent jurisdiction over securities.55 The Securities Act has been
amended several times since 1933, but none of these amendments would
45

See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 697.
Lane, supra note 26, at 323-24.
47
Id.
48
Karmel, supra note 3, at 111 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)
(holding that blue sky regulation of interstate rather than intrastate securities transactions is
unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce)).
49
Lane, supra note 26, at 324.
50
Haughey and Veler, supra note 24, at 698-700.
51
Id. at 698.
52
Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1987).
53
Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 698-700 (quoting Robert I. Millonzi, Concurrent
Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1492 (1963)).
54
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914).
55
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory
of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person.”).
46
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significantly curtail state regulatory authority over securities for over six
decades.56
C.

Efficacy of the Dual Regulatory System

Some commentators have urged that state securities registration
requirements and blue sky merit and quality regulations are ineffective in
protecting investors and burdensome on efficient capital formation.57
Each state’s securities laws have developed differently, and this has
engendered some discord between blue sky laws.58 Even states adopting
the Uniform Securities Act have modified the uniform act’s provisions.59
Additionally, states have developed different interpretations of the blue
sky law provisions they adopted,60 although the provisions may be
textually similar. Such variations with regard to merit requirements and
quality standards for registration have undermined the intent of the
Uniform Securities Act to achieve regulatory uniformity.61
Other commentators have argued that the rules for registering
most securities in most states are similar, despite the lack of perfect
uniformity, and coordinate well with federal registration rules.62
However, some states have historically enforced their merit and quality
provisions much more stringently than others.63 Moreover, differences in
regulation are most evident when issuers claim federal exemptions from
registration or are offering securities with substantial risk.64 These
56

See, e.g., Regulation D—Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2008)
(hereinafter Preliminary Notes, Regulation D) (“Nothing in these rules obviates the need to comply
with any applicable state law relating to the offer and sale of securities.”); Preliminary Notes, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008) (A regulatory exemption for securities resold privately to institutions
notes that “[n]othing in this section obviates the need for any person to comply with any applicable
state law relating to the offer or sale of securities.”).
57
See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 3, at 107, 117-18 (arguing that merit regulation burdens
interstate commerce and capital formation by restricting how issuers set prices and compensate
underwriters); but see Sargent, supra note 52, at 1031-34 (arguing that state merit reviews rarely
result in the inability to sell the securities, and when they do, issuers typically “withdraw the
application for registration and sell around that state.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58
See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 701-02.
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
Sargent, supra note 52, at 1030-32 (stating that most state securities acts are based on
a uniform act and contain exemptions from registration that are similar to the federal exemptions).
63
See, e.g., Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of
Comments and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689, 703-04 (1985)
(According to one study in the 1980s, attorneys typically found Texas, California, and Wisconsin to
be among the most “stringent” regulators of merit standards for securities.).
64
Sargent, supra note 52, at 1035 (noting that some states will not scrutinize any issue of
securities that is registered with the S.E.C. and that some states will carefully scrutinize issues of
certain highly speculative securities).
Many states adopted a model state exemption for offers exempt from federal
registration under Regulation D, the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption. Id. at 1032 n.25. Like the
Uniform Securities Act, not all states adopted it, and many states that had adopted the ULOE had
modified it. See S.E.C., REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR
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variations sustained a specialty market for blue sky lawyers,65 but they
added to the tremendous costs of complying with federal registration and
disclosure regulations.66
The development of the dual-regulatory system governing
securities illustrates that national securities markets must be regulated to
protect investors. Indeed, both state and federal securities regulations
were developed during financial crises, when investors had been injured
by market failures.67 However, it also illustrates the inefficiencies,
inefficacies, and complexities appurtenant to securities regulation in the
United States. The development of uniform and model state codes and
exemptions were state and private sector responses to the difficulty of
selling securities nationally. Changes to the dual-regulatory system
should therefore focus on harmonizing the interests of efficiency,
objectivity, and simplicity, with the interest of protecting investors.
III.

EFFICIENCY, OBJECTIVITY, AND SIMPLICITY IN THE
DUAL-REGULATORY SYSTEM

Federal securities regulatory policy has long reflected that
regulation should be limited to the extent needed to protect investors.
Two perennial registration exemptions, now found in § 4 of the
Securities Act of 1933, suggest that Congress never found it necessary to
require registration for “private offers” of securities and most trades
between investors.68 Subsection A will briefly discuss the statutory
private offering exemption. This discussion will illustrate how the
Supreme Court obfuscated the requirements for obtaining the exemption
by establishing a subjective test for all purported private offerings.
Subsection B will discuss the S.E.C.’s adoption of Regulation D
under the Securities Act of 1933. Regulation D was one of several S.E.C.
attempts to improve the efficiency of securities regulation by providing

OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” § 1(B)(3)(b) (1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm.
65
See Horowitz, supra note 1 (discussing how the market for “blue sky” attorneys
diminished after NSMIA).
66
See Campbell, supra note 4, at 181 (noting that an issuer’s high offering costs are
caused, in part, by compliance with merit and qualification regulations, discounts on sale price due
to resale restrictions, and out-of-pocket costs).
67
Lane, supra note 26, at 321; Macey and Miller, supra note 27, at 354 (noting that
investors were widely investing in highly speculative schemes prior to the first blue sky laws);
Sargent, supra note 27, at 792 (noting that state blue sky laws emerged to protect investors from
fraudulent investments).
68
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1)-(2). A private placement is the offer and sale of securities that
does not involve a public offering. As the Supreme Court discussed in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
a private offering does not turn solely on the number of purchasers, but rather the amount and type
of information available to the purchasers and the purchasers’ need for protection. 346 U.S. 119,
125-26 (1953).
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exemptions to registration for certain offers of securities.69 Specifically,
Rule 506 of Regulation D created a more objective test for obtaining a
private offering exemption than the Securities Act alone provided.70 The
Commission also promulgated similar exemptions for other types of
securities.71
Finally, Subsection C will introduce NSMIA and the preemption
standard for state securities law. As the legislative history indicates,
NSMIA was intended to obviate state registration, pre-sale qualifications,
and proxy regulations for certain securities typically traded in the
national securities market.72 NSMIA exemplifies an effort to rebalance
investor protections with the securities market’s need for greater
efficiency and simplicity.
A.

The Statutory Private Offering Exemption: Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act

The Securities Act of 1933 has always provided a statutory
private placement exemption and allowed issuers to avoid registering
certain securities.73 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act provides that
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering” are exempt
from federal securities registration requirements.74
However, the provision is ambiguous. NSMIA does not define
the words “not involving any public offering.”75 Prior to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., “public
offering” seemed to many—indeed, it seemed to the Commission and
Ralston Purina Co.—to refer to the number of persons or to the limits of
a group offered the securities.76 The trial and appellate courts in the
Ralston case also believed that an offer to a defined group, like a
company’s employees, was not a “public offering.”77

69

Regulation D—Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (2008) (hereinafter
Regulation D).
70
Id. § 230.506.
71
See, e.g., Regulation A—Conditional Small Issues Exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.25163 (2008) (Providing an exemption for small offers of securities totaling not more than $5,000,000);
Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2008) (establishing more definite requirements for obtaining an
exemption for intrastate offerings of securities under § 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act).
72
Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal
Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, at 307-08 (2003) (citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins.
Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
73
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121-22, 125 (1953) (The Commission
took issue with the fact that hundreds of employees were offered unregistered securities, regardless
of their positions within the company or their competence with financial matters.).
77
S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 102 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (D.C. Mo. 1952), aff’d, 200
F.2d 85, 92 (8th Cir. 1953), rev’d, 346 U.S. at 125-26.
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The Supreme Court in Ralston held that “public offering” refers
to an offer to investors who did not know nor have access to information
ordinarily disclosed during registration.78 The S.E.C. further obfuscated
this subjective standard by adopting subjective rules consistent with the
Ralston opinion.79 Former Rule 146 under the Securities Act required
that the issuer in a private offering reasonably believe that each offeree
had the knowledge, information, and business experience to evaluate the
investment.80 Under the Ralston and Rule 146 standards, the number of
offerees is not the sine qua non of a private offering.81 While the new
private offering standard served to protect investors, the lack of an
objective standard dissuaded issuers from seeking the private offering
exemption.82
B.

The Regulatory Private Offering Exemption: Rule 506 of
Regulation D

By the 1980s, several commentators and the S.E.C. recognized
that complying with federal securities regulations was considerably
difficult and expensive.83 The extensive reporting requirements were
especially burdensome for small businesses, which shouldered relatively
higher costs than large businesses in acquiring investment capital
through securities.84 Regulation D added efficient exemption rules,
couched in objective terms.
1. Regulation D
Regulation D, adopted under the Securities Act in April 1982,
originally provided six rules containing three new exemptions from
federal registration.85 Rules 501 through 503 set forth general terms and
78

Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 126-27.
17 C.F.R § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Transactions by an Issuer
Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering (hereinafter Former Rule 146), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261,
15,266 (May 2, 1974), repealed by Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales (hereinafter Exemption Revision), 47 Fed. Reg.
11,251, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982); see also Note, Revising the Private Placement Exemption, 82 YALE
L. J. 1512, 1519 (1973).
80
17 C.F.R § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Former Rule 146, supra note 79,
at 15,262.
81
See id.; Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-26.
82
See Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 357 n.13
(1984) (citing Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private Placements for the Few, 59 VA. L. REV. 886,
921-22 (1973)) (noting that the Rule 146 requirements were so stringent that smaller issuers chose
not to seek the exemption).
83
See id. at 355 n.1.
84
See id. at 356.
85
See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (2008); Exemption Revisions, supra note
79, at 11,251. These rules were amended in 1989, and Rules 507 and 508 were added. See
Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements (hereinafter 1989 Amendments), 54
Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,369-74 (Mar. 20, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.507-08 (2008)).
79
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definitions governing the Regulation D exemptions.86 Rules 504 and 505
provide the first two exemptions from federal registration for limited
offers not exceeding a certain value.87 Rule 506, the third exemption,
provides a regulatory private offering exemption in addition to, and in
combination with, the statutory private offering exemption under
§ 4(2).88
Rule 501 defines special terms and describes calculation
methods used for each exemption.89 For example, although an issuer
loses the Rule 506 private offering exemption if the issuer sells securities
to more than thirty-five investors,90 the thirty-five investors do not
include one’s spouse or any “accredited investors”91 like banks, the
issuer’s officers or directors, or very wealthy individuals.92
Rule 502 limns several mandatory general conditions for issuers
seeking to qualify for one of the exemptions.93 First, the issuer cannot
publicly advertise the securities or solicit sales from the public.94 Second,
the issuer must disclose substantial financial and non-financial
information to any purchaser that was not an “accredited investor” as
defined in Rule 501.95 Third, the issuer must reasonably ensure that no
purchaser plans to resell the securities and must disclose this limitation
on resale to each purchaser.96 Finally, Rule 502 warns that all securities
offered or sold within six months of the proposed Regulation D offering
may be considered part of that Regulation D offering, the “integration”
requirement.97 “Integration” may disqualify the offering for an
exemption, unless the issuer can give good reasons the separate offers
should not be integrated.98
86

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-03.
Id. §§ 230.504-05.
88
Id. § 230.506.
89
Id. § 230.501.
90
Id. § 230.506(b).
91
“Accredited investor[s]” are investors presumed to have sufficient financial or
business acumen, knowledge, or access to information to weigh the risks of investment. See id. §
230.501(a).
92
Id. § 230.501(f).
93
Id. § 230.502.
94
Id. § 230.502(c). Such advertisements include such activities as newspaper
publications or television advertisement Id. It also includes posting information regarding the offer
of securities on the internet. See Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2007).
95
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b). For a definition of “accredited investor,” see supra note 91.
96
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
97
Id. § 230.502(a). This rule prevents issuers from circumventing the dollar limits on
exempt offers under Rules 504 and 505 by breaking up the single offer of securities into smaller
offers. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962). The
integration requirement contained a “safe harbor” provision that guaranteed that separate offers or
sales of securities would not be integrated if they took place more than six months apart. 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(a).
98
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Whether two offers should be integrated into a single offer
under Regulation D depends upon a variety of factors:
87

(a) [w]hether the sales are part of a single plan of financing;
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The last of the general conditions, Rule 503, requires the issuer
to file a notice of sale (“Form D”) with the S.E.C within fifteen days of
the first offer.99 Form D is a check-the-box-style form that allows the
issuer to select the exemption or exemptions applicable to the particular
securities offering.100 The form requires the issuer to identify all partners,
officers, directors, promoters, non-accredited investors, and shareholders
owning 10% or more of any class of the securities offered.101 The issuer
must also state the offering price, the states in which the securities will
be offered, and all non-accredited investors, if any.102
2. The Rule 506 Regulatory Private Offering Exemption
The Rule 506 exemption responded to frustrations and criticisms
directed toward the S.E.C. following Ralston and Rule 146.103 It creates a
regulatory private offering exemption for any issuer who sells securities
to no more than thirty-five investors with sufficient financial acumen104
and complies with the conditions set forth in Rules 501 and 502 (and
originally, Rule 503).105 Many hedge funds—private investment
companies that typically engage in highly leveraged or short-term trading
strategies106—favor the Rule 506 exemption over other regulatory
exemptions because it allows the issuer to sell unregistered securities of
unlimited value to an unlimited number of accredited investors.107

(b) [w]hether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities;
(c) [w]hether the sales have been made at or about the same time;
(d) [w]hether the same type of consideration is being received; and
(e) [w]hether the sales are made for the same general purpose.
Id.; Non-Public Offering Exemption, supra note 97, at 11,317; see also S.E.C. v. Melchior, No. 90C-1024J, 1993 WL 89141, at *9 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 1993) (holding that an offer fails the Rule 506
exemption due to its “integration” with previous offers).
99
17 C.F.R. § 230.503.
100
S.E.C., Form D, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
101
Id. For a definition of “accredited investor,” see supra note 91.
102
Id.
103
See Exemption Revision, supra note 79, at 11,252; Warren, supra note 82, at 355-58.
For a discussion of Ralston Purina and Rule 146, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
104
The thirty-five investors do not include accredited investors. See supra notes 91-92
and accompanying text. Rule 506 requires the thirty-five investors to have sufficient financial
experience to be able to evaluate the investment, or have a financial advisor who does. 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b)(2)(ii).
105
17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see 1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369 (filing the Rule
503 notice is no longer required for any Regulation D exemption, but must still be filed under Rule
507). For the requirements of Rules 501 through 503, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying
text.
106
Practising Law Institute, Hedge Funds, 1589 PLI/Corp 309, 313 (2007).
107
See id. at 315. Rule 506 does place a limit on the number of investors, but accredited
investors are excluded from the calculation of the number of investors under Rule 501. 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501(e)(1)(iv), 506 (2008).
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Rule 506 is considered a “safe harbor” provision for securities
issued under § 4(2).108 A safe harbor is a prophylactic provision that
permits one to avoid liability or statutory or regulatory penalties.109 Rule
506 allows issuers to avoid losing a private offering exemption by
providing an objective standard for determining whether an offer of
securities qualifies for the exemption.110
The adoption of Regulation D and Rule 506 exemplified the
S.E.C.’s ideological shift away from qualitative and subjective rules.111
However, even Rule 506, as originally drafted, did not completely satisfy
the market’s need for efficiency and simplicity.112 Originally, Rule 506
required unmitigated compliance with Rules 501 through 503 and the
thirty-five purchaser limitation.113 These technical requirements were
objective, but complex and demanding.114
An issuer seeking a regulatory private offering exemption in
1982 faced a host of technical compliance issues under Regulation D.
For example, if the purchaser was an individual, not a bank or other
institutional investor, the issuer had to inquire as to the individual’s net
worth or annual income.115 If some investors were not accredited, the
issuer had to give such investors audited financial statements, plus much
of the non-financial information that would have been disclosed through
registration.116 Additionally, the issuer had to gauge the financial acumen
of all non-accredited purchasers, or their financial advisors, to ensure that
the investor could sufficiently understand the risks of investment.117
Failure to satisfy any of the Rule 506 requirements, before the
1989 amendments to Regulation D, was ostensibly fatal to the regulatory
exemption.118 Having satisfied most of the pre-amendment exemption
conditions, the issuer could still have lost the exemption fifteen days
after the first offer by failing to file the Form D notice of sale.119 The
108

15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see also Warren, supra note 82, at 357.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004).
110
17 C.F.R. § 230.506. The standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina
made it more complex and difficult for issuers to determine whether any particular offer would be
considered non-public. See Exemption Revisions, supra note 79, at 11,252; S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina,
346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
111
See Exemption Revision, supra note 79, at 11,251.
112
See Warren, supra note 82, at 383.
113
Regulation D, supra note 69, at 11,266 (current version codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506).
114
Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics
of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 240-41 (1990) (noting that initial exuberance
regarding Regulation D waned as investors struggled with the disclosure rules, integration, and the
notice-filing requirements).
115
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(6)-(7).
116
Id. § 230.502(b).
117
Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); see also supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
118
Cf. Warren, supra note 82, at 383 (Although the exemption would be lost, the S.E.C.
had discretion to make exceptions in any particular case.).
119
Regulation D, supra note 69, at 11,265-66 (current version codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
230.503, 506(b)) (Rule 506 originally required compliance with Rule 503 as a condition of the
private offering exemption.); see also Warren, supra note 82, at 383.
109
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issuer could also have lost the exemption by selling a non-exempt
security at any time during the following six months (due to the
“integration” provision of Rule 502).120 Although the S.E.C. had
discretion to exempt issuers that failed to satisfy a technical requirement
of Rule 506, investors could seek rescission of their purchase in court,
claiming the issuer illegally sold them unregistered, non-exempt
securities.121 An issuer, cast out from under the protective aegis of Rule
506, was forced to prove a § 4(2) statutory exemption under the
subjective test in Ralston.122
In 1989, the S.E.C. addressed these problems of complexity by
amending Regulation D.123 The amendment first omitted the Rule 503
notice filing requirement from every Regulation D exemption, such that
no Regulation D exemption will fail due to a failure to file Form D.124
However, the Commission maintained the notice filing requirement by
adding Rule 507, which automatically disqualifies one who violates Rule
503 from claiming any future Regulation D exemption, subject to the
discretion of the S.E.C.125 Thus, the amendment simplifies Regulation D
exemption requirements without significantly diminishing investor
protections.
The Commission further adopted Rule 508, an additional safe
harbor for issuers seeking a Regulation D exemption.126 Rule 508 allows
issuers to commit insignificant violations of Regulation D conditions
without abdicating any exemptions, so long as the issuers attempt to
comply in good faith and no one was harmed by the violation.127 Rule
508 maintains, however, that general solicitation128 or exceeding the
permissible number of purchasers under Rule 502 cannot be deemed
insignificant.129 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the effect
120
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). For a discussion of integration, see supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text.
121
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to offer or sell unregistered (and nonexempt) securities); id. § 77l(a) (2006) (providing civil liabilities for violating the registration
requirements of § 5); Warren, supra note 82, at 383.
122
See Preliminary Notes, Regulation D, supra note 56 (“Attempted compliance with any
rule in Regulation D does not act as an exclusive election; the issuer can also claim the availability
of any other applicable exemption. For instance, an issuer’s failure to satisfy all the terms and
conditions of Rule 506 shall not raise any presumption that the exemption provided by section 4(2)
of the Act is not available.”); S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
123
1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369; see Sargent, supra note 114, at 241-42.
124
1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369; see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125
17 C.F.R. § 230.507.
126
Id. § 230.508.
127
See id.
128
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
129
17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(2); see id. § 230.502(c) (regarding limitations on general
solicitation); Pinnacle, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (holding that a failure to provide an audited balance
sheet to investors that were not “accredited investors” may defeat a Regulation D exemption);
Risdall, 733 N.W.2d at 829 (stating that any general solicitation will defeat a Regulation D private
placement exemption, without regard to whether the general solicitation was intentional or
inadvertent).
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of Rule 508 in 1992, finding that a sale to non-accredited investors
without providing audited financial statements130 was harmless error
under Rule 508 because the investor represented himself as an accredited
investor.131
3. Lessons from “D-regulation”
Although Regulation D did not remedy all problems with the
dual regulatory system, it demonstrates certain goals of regulating
securities markets in the United States. These include balancing the
investor’s need for protection against fraud and risky investments with
the market’s need for efficient, cost minimizing procedures; objective,
clearly defined rules; and simple, easy to follow provisions.
The dual regulatory structure of securities markets protected
investors at the cost of diminished efficiency in capital formation.132
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempted private offerings of
securities from registration to reduce the costs and burdens of registration
at a minimal risk to investors.133 While this exemption promoted
efficiency in securities markets, the Ralston decision illustrates how
liberal use of the exemption could threaten investor protections.134 The
regulatory solution, provided by former Rule 146, rendered the
conditions for the private offering exemption so subjective as to diminish
the utility of the exemption and the efficiency of securities markets.135
Rule 506 of Regulation D introduced objective conditions, providing
issuers a safe harbor to engage in private offerings without fear of losing
their exemption.136 However, the Rule 506 requirements were so complex
and unforgiving that it was easy to lose or fail to qualify for the
exemption.137 Finally, the 1989 amendments introduced an additional
safe harbor to Regulation D, simplifying the conditions for each of its
exemptions and ensuring that no exemption would fail due to harmless
error.138
C.

The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996

Efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity in securities regulation
only become more important as markets expand both domestically and
130

See supra notes 95 and 116 and accompanying text.
Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1992).
132
See discussion supra Part II.C.
133
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see discussion supra Part III.A.
134
S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125-26; see discussion supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
135
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Former Rule 146, supra note
79, at 15,262; see discussion supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
136
See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
137
See supra notes 111-122 and accompanying text.
138
See supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text.
131
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internationally. Between 1979 and 1999 alone, the percentage of U.S.
households investing in mutual funds increased from 6% to 49%, which
may be attributed to the growth and development of retirement funds.139
In 2005, individual, non-institutional investors poured an estimated $400
billion or more into hedge funds.140 At the end of 2007, registered
investment companies in the United States controlled over $12 trillion of
investor capital, excluding hedge funds.141 International capital markets
are also expected to expand dramatically in the near future.142 One need
look no further than the recent merger between the NYSE and Euronext
securities exchanges,143 the merger of In Bev and Anheuser Busch,144 or
Abu Dhabi’s purchase of the Chrysler building145 to witness a more
liberal global capital market.
Commentators over the past few decades offered different views
regarding the viability of the dual regulatory system, given the growth of
securities markets. Some argued that duplicative regulation hampered
capital formation by requiring costly compliance with multifarious
registration and disclosure requirements.146 Others argued that merit and
quality standards, found in many blue sky laws and the Uniform
Securities Act,147 were costly and unnecessary to protect investors.148
Still, others defended blue sky laws, arguing that such laws offered
investors protection against fraud and excessive risk and illustrating how
139

S.E.C. DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES
EXPENSES (2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2008).
140
Hennesee Group, LLC, Information on Number of Hedge Funds & Assets (Jan-50 to
Jan-07) (2007), available at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/index.html (last visited
July 25, 2008); Hennesee Group, LLC, Sources of Hedge Fund Capital (2007), available at
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/index.html (last visited July 25, 2008). This figure is
estimated based on data gathered from hedge fund surveys because hedge funds are not required to
register with or submit reports to the S.E.C. See Hennesee Group, LLC, What is a Hedge Fund?
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/hedgefund/index.html (last visited July 25, 2008).
141
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A
REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 20 (48th ed. 2008),
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
142
See Brian J. Fahrney, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption
Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 775-76 (1992).
143
See generally NYSE Euronext Corporate Press Kit, available at http://www.nyse.com/
about/ newsevents/1173781658059.html (NYSE commenced trading on April 4, 2007); Jenny
Anderson & Heather Timmons, NYSE Group Reaches Deal to Acquire Euronext, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 2006, at C3 (noting that the merger between the large, New York-based exchanged and the panEuropean exchange would create the first trans-Atlantic marketplace for securities).
144
See generally Anheuser-Busch InBev, InBev and Anheuser Busch Agree to Combine,
Creating the Global Leader in Beer with Budweiser as its Flagship Brand (July 13, 2008),
http://www.anheuserbusch.com/ Press/PressImages/FINAL%20PRESS%20RELEASE.pdf.
145
See generally Charles V. Bagli, Abu Dhabi Buys 90% Stake in Chrysler Building, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2008, at B3.
146
See, e.g., Fahrney, supra note 142, at 776; Karmel, supra note 3, at 106-08.
147
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
148
See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 566 (1985) (arguing that merit regulation of securities is antithetical
to a market economy); Fahrney, supra note 142, at 765-66 (noting that merit review adds to the
state’s administrative fees and the issuer’s legal and accounting fees).
AND
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such laws allowed inexperienced investors to perform as well as
experienced investors.149 Another commentator urged that blue sky laws
provide necessary disclosures to investors that federal disclosures would
not reveal.150 Federal policy would reflect the arguments in favor of a
singular regulatory system.
In 1996, Congress passed NSMIA, which limited the
applicability of blue sky laws to improve the efficiency of national
securities markets.151 The introduction to NSMIA heralds the intent of
the statue, “[t]o amend the Federal securities laws in order to promote
efficiency and capital formation in the financial markets, and to . . .
promote more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors,
and provide more effective and less burdensome regulation.”152 The
House Commerce Committee report, accompanying House Resolution
2003 (NSMIA), reiterated this contention,153 and further recognized the
need to modify the dual-regulatory system:
Testimony demonstrated a clear need for modernization and indicated
that, notwithstanding past reform efforts, there continues to be a
substantial degree of duplication between Federal and State securities
regulation, and that this duplication tends to raise the cost of capital to
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate
protection to investors or our markets.154

Accordingly, NSMIA federalized registration and disclosure
requirements for certain offerings involving “covered securities,” as
defined in the act.155 States are not only prohibited from requiring
registration or disclosures for these “covered securities,” but also from
prohibiting or regulating the sale of such securities based on their merit
or quality.156
The term “covered securities,” as defined under NSMIA,
encompasses a broad array of securities.157 “Covered securities” includes
securities traded on national exchanges like the NYSE, the AMEX, and
149
See, e.g., Lane, supra note 26, at 338, 347-48 (arguing that local authorities can best
enforce securities regulation and that state authority should be balanced with federal authority, not
abrogated); Walker & Hadaway, supra note 23, at 681 (finding that inexperienced investors in meritregulating states have performed as well as experienced investors elsewhere).
150
See Sargent, supra note 52, at 1056-59.
151
See NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996).
152
Id.
153
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3877.
154
Id. at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878. “Covered securities” encompass
(1) securities traded on national exchanges, (2) securities sold by investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, (3) securities sold to “qualified purchasers,” as yet
undefined, and (4) certain securities sold in exempt offerings. See Kevin A. Jones, The National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53
ARK. L. REV. 153, 156-64 (2000).
155
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(2), (b)(4) (2006).
156
See id. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(3).
157
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 3877.
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the NASDAQ Stock Market.158 All securities issued by registered
investment companies (e.g., most mutual fund shares) are “covered
securities” as well.159 A third category of “covered securities”
encompasses securities sold to “qualified purchasers,” a term that the
S.E.C. has not yet defined and gives the S.E.C. considerable authority to
expand the scope of NSMIA.160 Finally, “covered securities” includes
securities sold in certain offerings exempt from federal registration.161
The problems of interpretation raised in this Note concern
primarily the fourth and final category of “covered securities,” which
includes securities qualifying for the regulatory private offering
exemption under Regulation D Rule 506.162 As indicated earlier, § 4(2) of
the Securities Act provides a statutory private placement exemption
covering any transaction that does not involve a “public offering,” but
the statutory exemption employs a highly subjective test.163 Rule 506
provides a set of objective conditions that would allow an issuer to
qualify for a regulatory private offering exemption.164 NSMIA extends
the policy of exemption to state regulators because investors in a Rule
506 private offering are, by definition, accredited165 or otherwise capable
of making informed investment decisions without the protection of
government.166 In addition to securities qualifying for the Rule 506
exemption, “covered securities” include securities satisfying certain
exemptions: (1) the exemption for transactions by one who is not an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer,167 (2) the exemptions for certain
158

15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 156.
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 157.
160
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 158-59. Although the
Commission has not adopted a formal definition of “qualified purchaser” to date, the Commission
has proposed that an appropriate definition would be similar, if not identical, to that of a Rule 501
“accredited investor.” See Defining the Term “Qualified Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of
1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230 (proposed Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/338041.htm [hereinafter Qualified Purchaser].
161
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 162 (summarizing these
securities as “certain government and bank securities, securities issued by certain pension, profitsharing and similar plans, notes having a maturity of less than nine months, interests in railroad
equipment trusts, certain certificates issued in a case under Title 11, and certain insurance,
endowment, or annuity contracts”).
162
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (“covered security” includes any security exempt from
federal registration under any S.E.C. rule issued under the Securities Act § 4(2), the private offering
exemption).
163
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see supra also notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
164
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see also supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
165
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
166
See Jones, supra note 154, at 163.
167
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1); id. § 77r(b)(4)(A). An issuer is one who issues securities.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (8th ed. 2004). An underwriter is usually an investment banker that
purchases securities from the issuer and resells the securities to the public. Id. at 1562. A dealer is
one who buys securities and sells them at retail. Id. at 427. For the statutory definitions of the terms
“issuer,” underwriter,” or “dealer,” see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), (11)-(12) (2006). This exemption
applies to trades by investors selling securities already issued, trades in the secondary securities
market, which are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 79A C.J.S. Securities
Regulation § 63 (2007); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60.
159
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transactions by dealers and brokers,168 and (3) the various exemptions
allowed under § 3(a) for securities like federal bonds, insurance policies,
and commercial paper.169
However, Congress has not abrogated all of the states’ regulatory
functions. NSMIA does not preclude states from prosecuting securities
fraud, thereby preserving the principal function and purpose of blue sky
laws.170 The act also permits states to require notice of offers and sales,
payment of fees, and the disclosure of certain other information for the
purposes of collecting fees and consenting to service of process.171
Finally, “covered securities” does not include all securities,172 and it
specifically excludes certain types of securities.173
IV.

THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT PREEMPTION STANDARD UNDER
NSMIA

Like Regulation D in 1982, NSMIA was not adopted without its
flaws. Indeed, the definition of “covered securities” was amended in
1998 to prevent NSMIA from preventing state courts from ruling on the
fairness of mergers and reorganizations, in which shares are commonly
exchanged for other shares without registration.174 Additionally, courts in
several state and federal jurisdictions have been unable to agree on a
preemption standard under NSMIA for securities qualifying for the Rule
506 private offering exemption.175 It is not clear whether Congress
168
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(3)-(4); id. §§ 77r(b)(4)(A)-(B). The “dealer” exemption applies
to all transactions made by a securities dealer—one who buys and sells securities, usually on the
secondary market—except when that dealer is trading as an “underwriter”—one who buys
unregistered securities from the issuer with the intent to resell to the public. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 427, 1562 (8th ed. 2004); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60 & nn.42-43.
The “broker” exemption applies to all transactions by a securities broker—one who
buys and sells securities on behalf of someone else—when that broker is merely selling securities
based on a customer’s order. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (8th ed. 2004); see also Jones, supra
note 154, at 160-61 & n.47.
169
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2006). Not all exemptions found under Securities Act of 1933
§ 3(a) are “covered securities” under NSMIA. For example, NSMIA excludes those securities
qualifying for the intrastate offering exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11), and the exemption for
charitable and not-for-profit issuers, id. § 77c(a)(4). Id. § 77r(b)(4)(C); see also Jones, supra note
154, at 162.
“Covered securities” was later amended to exclude securities exchanged pursuant to a
government-approved fairness hearing. See Div. Corp. Fin., S.E.C., Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No.
3: Section 3(a)(10) Exemption (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb3r.htm.
Such securities are exempt from federal registration under Securities Act § 3(a) if a court has already
determined that the transaction is fair to investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10). This corrected the
unintended effect of NSMIA preempting a state court from ruling on the fairness of an exchange of
securities during a merger or other corporate reorganization. See Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3,
supra.
170
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 164.
171
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(A); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 164-65.
172
See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
173
For securities specifically excluded from “covered securities,” see supra note 169.
174
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
175
Compare Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 298 (Ala. 2005) (holding that
proof of a Regulation D exemption is required before the issuer is exempt from state regulation
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intended the preemption provision of NSMIA to be applied narrowly—
only if the issuer can prove that the security qualifies for the private
offering exemption—or broadly—preempting blue sky law for all
securities offered pursuant to the private offering exemption. As Chief
Judge Babcock of the Colorado District Court phrased the issue, must an
issuer “prove preemption by proving exemption?”176
Subsection A will discuss the problem of determining Congress’
intent with respect to the breadth of blue sky law preemption under
NSMIA. Subsection B will examine the narrow preemption standard for
private offerings: NSMIA preempts state regulation private offerings
only if the issuer can first prove that the Rule 506 private offering
exemption applies.177 Subsection C will evaluate the broad preemption
standard for private offerings under NSMIA: NSMIA broadly preempts
blue sky laws for any securities offered pursuant to Rule 506. Proponents
of this standard asseverate that Congress intended for national securities
offerings to be regulated exclusively by federal law, including securities sold
pursuant to a federal exemption, even if the federal exemption is invalid.178
A.

Preemption of State Law and the Private Offering Exemption

Although NSMIA preempts blue sky laws regulating several
types of securities and transactions, securities sold in private offerings
present a special case for the application of NSMIA’s preemption rules.
The primary purpose of NSMIA is to improve the efficiency of capital
formation in national securities markets, without undermining the
protection of investors.179 The legislative history further suggests that
NSMIA would improve efficiency and reduce the cost of capital
formation by federalizing securities regulation.180 Accordingly, NSMIA
prohibits states from requiring registration, disclosure, or merit review
for certain “covered securities” like those traded in private offerings.181
This history suggests that Congress intended for the federal government
to regulate Rule 506 private offerings exclusively. However, it is not
clear whether exclusive regulation of private offerings includes the
under NSMIA), with Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that NSMIA preempts blue sky law regulating any securities offered in reliance upon the
regulatory private offering exemption of Rule 506).
176
See Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding
that the issuer must prove the exemption in order to prove that state law was preempted under NSMIA).
177
E.g., Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We
now agree with those courts that have held that offerings must actually qualify for a valid federal
securities registration exemption in order to enjoy NSMIA preemption.”).
178
E.g., Risdall, 733 N.W.2d at 832 (“‘[W]hen an offering purports to be exempt under
federal Regulation D, any allegation of improper registration is covered exclusively by federal law.’”
(quoting Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087
(D. Minn. 2006))).
179
See NSMIA, supra note 151, at 3416; see also supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
180
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878.
181
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
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exclusive imposition of federal remedies when such purportedly private
offerings fail to satisfy Rule 506.
The narrow preemption standard stems from a strict, textualist
interpretation of the Act. Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended by NSMIA, provides unambiguously that only “exempt”
securities are “covered securities” under NSMIA:
(a) Scope of exemption. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no law,
rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or any
political subdivision thereof—
(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities,
or registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or
indirectly apply to a security that—
(A) is a covered security; or
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the
transaction;
....
(b) Covered securities. For purposes of this section, the following are covered
securities:
....
(4) Exemption in connection with certain exempt offerings.—A security is
a covered security with respect to a transaction that is exempt from
registration under this subchapter pursuant to—
....
(D) Commission rules or regulations issued under section 77d(2)
of this title, except that this subparagraph does not prohibit a
State from imposing notice filing requirements that are
substantially similar to those required by rule or regulation
under section 77d(2) of this title that are in effect on September
1, 1996.182

Subsection (b)(4)(D) refers to “rules or regulations issued under
section [4](2).”183 Rule 506 of Regulation D provides, in relevant part:
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the
conditions in paragraph (b) of this section shall be deemed to be transactions
not involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the
Act.184

When NSMIA is read in light of Rule 506, the use of the word
“exempt” in subsection (b)(4)(D) suggests that NSMIA will only
182
183
184

Id. §§ 77r(a)-(b) (emphasis in subsection 18(b)(4) added).
Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
17 C.F. R. § 230.506.
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preempt blue sky law from regulating private offerings if such offerings
actually satisfy the terms of Rule 506.185
NSMIA’s preemption standard is more difficult to apply with a
Rule 506 private offering than with any other covered security under
NSMIA because it is relatively easy to identify other types of covered
securities.186 For example, NSMIA exempts from state regulation all
securities sold on national exchanges, federal bonds, and mutual fund
shares,187 but these covered securities are readily identifiable, without
complicated inquiry or extensive investigation.
Additionally, the issue of whether one must “prove preemption
by proving exemption”188 does not arise with most transactions exempt
from state regulations under NSMIA. The § 4(1) exemption for
transactions by those who are not issuers, underwriters, or dealers
ordinarily covers average investor transactions in the secondary market
without causing undue confusion.189 The §§ 4(3) and 4(4) exemptions for
dealer and broker transactions are simple to apply in most cases because
almost all dealer transactions are exempt and broker transactions are
exempt if the broker is merely placing a client’s order on an exchange or
over-the-counter market.190 One difficulty that may arise in keeping these
§ 4 exemptions is avoiding status as an “underwriter,” one who acquires
a security from an issuer with the intent to distribute it to the public.191
However, even if a case were to arise, challenging NSMIA preemption
based on the failure of one of these § 4 exemptions, Rule 144 of the
Securities Act provides a safe harbor against underwriter status with an
objective set of conditions.192

185

For a discussion of the terms of Rule 506, see supra Part III.B.2.
But see supra note 160 and accompanying text (defining the class of “covered
securities” as those securities sold to “qualified purchasers”). Depending on how the Commission
eventually defines this term, an issue similar to the one analyzed in this Note may arise.
187
See 15 U.S.C. § §77r(b)(1), (b)(4)(C).
188
Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2006).
189
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1); see Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2007) (“Section 4(1)
was intended to exempt only routine trading transactions between individual investors with respect
to securities already issued and not to exempt distributions by issuers or acts of other individuals
who engage in steps necessary to such distributions.”); see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
190
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1)-(3); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60; see supra note
168 and accompanying text.
191
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11); Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1) (stating that a seller who qualifies as an underwriter is not exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act).
192
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(1)-(3); see Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60. Under Rule 144,
dealers and investors holding unregistered securities can avoid underwriter status by ensuring that
there is adequate public information on the security they are selling, holding the security for at least
a year before selling, limiting the number of shares sold, and selling the securities in broker
transactions, all within the terms of Rule 144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)-(f). Brokers can avoid being
considered underwriters by trading only upon client orders, refusing to solicit sales of the securities,
collecting fees at a standard rate for each transaction, and asking clients a few questions about the
nature of the securities. See id. § 230.144(g).
186
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In contrast, determining whether a security is exempt from
registration under Rule 506 requires a much more complicated inquiry.193
As previously discussed, the issuer must inquire as to each of purchaser’s
knowledge and finances, to provide such financial and non-financial
information to certain purchasers that the issuer would have prepared for
certain registration statements, and to avoid making any public statement
that may be considered an impermissible general solicitation.194
Moreover, a Rule 506 private offering exemption can be
transitory, in that certain conditions after the completion of the offering
may abrogate the exemption retroactively.195 Regulation D “integrates”
certain offers made within six months of each other and treats them as a
single offer,196 such that a later, non-exempt offer may void an earlier
offer’s exemption.197 An issuer who fails to qualify for a Rule 506
exemption might not discover the failure of the exemption until much
later because the veracity of private offering exemptions is often tested
for the first time in court.198
The greater degree of uncertainty appurtenant to every private
offering under Rule 506 begs the question whether the conditions for
preemption should be as elusive and convoluted as the conditions for
exemption. To answer this question affirmatively is to advance the public
policy of protecting investors. To resolve this issue by relaxing the
conditions for preemption is to effect a more unitary and efficient
securities market. Any resolution, however, must be driven by S.E.C.
regulation. Courts have not resolved this issue uniformly,199 which only
further undermines the efficiencies NSMIA was intended to introduce.200
B.

Narrow Construction of NSMIA’s Preemption Provision

Some courts have held that an issuer claiming a regulatory
private placement exemption under Rule 506 is not exempt from state
law unless the issuer proves the validity of the private offering

193

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part III.B.2.
195
See, e.g., Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 297-98 (Ala. 2005) (“Even if
the filing of a Form D is sufficient to obtain the exemption necessary for a finding of federal
preemption, proof that an exemption was obtained is no evidence that the exemption exists at any
later date . . . .”).
196
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (The integration requirement under
Regulation D applies to each of the Regulation D exemptions.).
197
See S.E.C. v. Melchior, No. 90-C-1024J, 1993 WL 89141, at *9 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 1993).
198
Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1086-87 (D. Minn. 2006) (Rule 506 exemption threatened more than two years after the initial
offering because the issuer named two non-accredited investors on its Form D filing, allegedly due
to a clerical error that was later corrected).
199
Compare Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921
(E.D. Ark 2006), with Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
200
H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878 (1996).
194
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exemption.201 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
was the first federal court to decide this issue in 2002, adopting a more
liberal interpretation of the NSMIA preemption rules.202 In Temple v.
Gorman, the Florida court reasoned that Congress intended to make the
federal government the exclusive regulator for national securities offerings.203
However, since that time, the weight of authority has been tipped
overwhelmingly toward a narrow construction of the NSMIA preemption
provision, based on a textualist reading of the statute.204 The first court to
disagree with the Temple standard was the Alabama Supreme Court in
Buist v. Time Domain Corp.205 In that case, after an allegedly unfair
reorganization, a minority shareholder sought rescission based on the
corporate issuer’s failure to register the securities in Alabama.206
Although the company had completed the offering and indicated that the
offering was subject to the Rule 506 exemption on its Form D,207 the
Court held that the company needed to prove that the securities were exempt
under Rule 506 when issued and continued to qualify for the exemption:
[F]ailure to comply with a requirement of Rule 506 “voids” the exemption,
thereby eliminating the possibility of preemption . . . . [T]he exempt status of
the sale of securities that deviates from any of the material commitments made
in its Form D filing is repealed retroactively.208

The Buist court dismissed the preemption standard adopted by the
Florida District Court as unsubstantiated, without any authority.209
Other courts were quick to follow at both the state and federal
levels. The Colorado Federal District Court later held in Grubka v.
WebAccess that the statute unambiguously requires proof of the Rule 506
exemption before a finding of state law preemption.210 The federal court
in Grubka notably followed the Alabama state court’s decision in
Buist,211 and not the Florida Federal District Court’s in Temple.212 An
Ohio appellate court adopted the Buist court’s preemption standard,213 as

201

See Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 906, 911-12 (6th Cir. 2007).
Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44.
203
Id. at 1244.
204
See Brown, 481 F.3d at 909-10; Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d
1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006); Hamby, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 921; In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871
N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 298 (Ala. 2005).
205
926 So. 2d at 297.
206
See id. at 292-93.
207
Id. at 292. For a discussion of Form D, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
208
Buist, 926 So .2d at 298.
209
See id. at 297.
210
Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006) (finding
that NSMIA unambiguously requires an exemption before the statute will preempt state law and that
it is unnecessary to turn to legislative history for the intent of Congress).
211
Buist, 926 So. 2d at 298.
212
Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
213
In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
202
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did a California appellate court in a recent case.214 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the highest court to review the relevant authority
on this issue, also held that preemption was predicated on proof of a valid
exemption.215 In rejecting the holding in Temple, the court reasoned that:
[Those suggesting a broad preemption standard] urge us to avert our eyes from
the statute’s plain language and look instead to legislative intent as supposedly
espoused by the gloss on which they . . . rely. But resorting to legislative
history is always a risky endeavor, subject to manipulation by individual
legislators and by simple mistakes of fact by the courts.216

The narrow preemption standard is easily supported by the
statute and prevents possible abuse of NSMIA. Requiring some proof
that the security is exempt, and therefore a covered security, prevents
issuers from circumventing state law investor protections by claiming a
Rule 506 exemption in offering documents, or even claiming the
exemption ex post.217 “Such an intent seems unlikely, in any event; that a
defendant could avoid liability under state law simply by declaiming its
alleged compliance with Regulation D is an unsavory proposition and
would eviscerate the statute.”218
However, there are practical problems with the narrow
preemption standard. NSMIA preempts state registration and merit
regulation of exempt private offerings,219 and the Rule 506 private
offering exemption may be lost retroactively.220 Under the narrow
preemption standard, issuers would only have to prove a private offering
exemption to the states after the offering, when an investor raises the
issue of NSMIA preemption.221 This means that states do not actually
regulate securities offered pursuant to Rule 506. Instead, the validity of
the Rule 506 exemption only determines whether each individual state is
allowed to impose remedies for failing to register the non-exempt
security. This provides little, if any, additional protection to investors.
Second, the uncertainty of preemption eviscerates the economies
that normally inhere in preemption because it gives issuers an incentive
to register private offerings with the states, instead of relying on

214

Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199, 220
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (accepting the 6th Circuit’s decision in Brown as the strongest authority on this
issue, given the line of cases criticizing the holding in Temple).
215
See Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2007).
216
Id.
217
See COHN, supra note 18, § 6:24.50.
218
Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006).
219
See supra Part III.C.
220
Warren, supra note 82, at 383; see supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
221
An issuer is required to file a Form D notice of sale with the S.E.C. and the state when
conducting a private offering. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.503, .507 (2008). Form D does not require proof that
the Rule 506 exemption is valid. See S.E.C., Form D, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
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preemption. This result undermines the purpose of NSMIA, to make national
securities markets simpler and more efficient by federalizing regulation.222
Finally, although blue sky laws largely provide the same
rescission remedy as federal law—forcing the issuer to return all
amounts purchasers paid for the securities, plus interest—the state laws
provide other remedies, which may amount to greater expenses to issuers
than under federal law.223 For example, the Uniform Securities Act
provides for payment of costs and attorneys fees for failure to register
securities under state law, but the remedies under the Securities Act do
not.224 Several states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act’s model
remedies.225 The imposition of different remedies by different states for a
failure to satisfy the Rule 506 conditions increases the costs of ensuring
legal compliance of private offerings, encourages unnecessary and purely
prophylactic registration, and undermines much of the efficiency and
simplicity NMSIA purported to introduce to securities markets.
C.

Broad Construction of NSMIA’s Preemption Provision

The broad construction of NSMIA’s preemption provision for
private offerings is more consistent with the purpose of NSMIA and
other securities regulations in achieving efficiency, objectivity, and,
simplicity.226 Under the broad preemption standard, an issuer
commencing a private offering pursuant to Rule 506 obtains the benefit
of preemption simply by claiming the exemption in their offering
documents.227 Some courts have held that blue sky laws are preempted
once the issuer files Form D, the notice of sale pursuant to Regulation D.228
Florida’s Southern District Court turned to the legislative intent
to glean the appropriate preemption standard.229 The issuer in Temple v.
Gorman sold shares of an online retailer to 112 investors in a Rule 506
private offering.230 After the collapse of technology stocks between 1999
and 2001, purchasers sought rescission of their purchases and sued the
222

See supra Part III.C.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006), with UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509 (2002), available at
http://www.uniformsecuritiesact.org/usa/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=48.
224
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(1).
225
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106(a)(1) (West 2000); MICHIGAN COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 451.810 (West 2002).
226
See supra Part III.
227
See Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
Neither the parties in their brief nor the court in its opinion acknowledged whether the issuer
properly filed Form D; the issue of preemption turned only on whether the issuer claimed the
exemption in its private placement memorandum. Id.
228
See Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006); Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
For a discussion of Form D, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
229
Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878 (stating that NSMIA’s purpose is to federalize securities markets).
230
Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-40.
223
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issuer for failing to register under Florida’s blue sky laws.231 The court
cited Congressional Reports, in which the House Commerce Committee
stated it “intends that the section 4(2) exemption from State regulation
facilitate private placement of securities consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors.”232 Because the issuer had filed
Form D and had issued the securities pursuant to Rule 506, the court held
that the state could not demand a separate registration statement.233
When the Florida District Court decided Temple, few doubted
that Congress intended to provide expansive preemption in order to
assume exclusive regulatory authority over national securities markets.
The Second Circuit, in Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., noted
that NSMIA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(“SLUSA”)—which requires certain class action securities fraud cases to
be litigated in federal courts234—are part of a common scheme to
federalize regulation of certain nationally traded securities.235 One article
from 1998 lamented the extinction of the blue sky lawyer, stating “[t]he
chief cause of the decreased workload [for lawyers specializing in blue
sky law] was the Congressional passage in 1996 of the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA). The legislation
transferred the lion’s share of responsibility for securities regulation from
individual states to the federal government.”236
Many courts have also adopted a broad preemption standard. The
North Dakota Federal District Court in Lillard v. Stockton agreed with
the preemption standard established in Temple but had little other
authority available.237 The District Court of Minnesota also adopted the
broad preemption standard in Pinnacle Communications International,
Inc. v. American Family Mortgage Corp., citing, as the court in Temple,
the intent of the legislature.238 Most recently, a Minnesota appellate court
adopted the broad preemption standard in Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert,
Inc.239 However, the Risdall court cited policy reasons for adopting broad
preemption: federal courts interpreting federal law are better at deciding
the issue of whether a Regulation D exemption is valid.240 In other words,
231

See id. at 1240.
Id. at 1243 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 3894-95).
233
Id. at 1244.
234
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227, 3228 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 77p(b) (2006)).
235
See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir.2001)
(holding that a class action against a seller of variable annuity contracts must be brought in federal
court under SLUSA).
236
Horowitz, supra note 1. The article further suggests that, in order for blue sky lawyers
to maintain their practices, they must change their focus or try to manufacture new issues. See id.
237
267 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1116 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (disposing of the issue without deeper
analysis because plaintiffs failed to respond to the argument that NSMIA preempted their state law
claims).
238
417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006).
239
See 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
240
See id.
232
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the broad preemption standard not only improves market efficiency, but
also promotes judicial economy by barring multifarious pronouncements
on Rule 506 and NSMIA from state-court judges.241
While the broad preemption standard admittedly contradicts the
plain language of the statute, it does not follow that Congress or the
S.E.C. intended for NSMIA’s preemption provision for private offerings
to be applied so narrowly. Congress left much to the discretion of the
S.E.C. and purposefully included several lacunae for the S.E.C. to fill in
order to best protect the interests of investors.242 Moreover, the legislative
history is replete with references to acts by the commission to clarify the
meaning of the act.243
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit’s argument in Brown that the
S.E.C. imposed the Rule 506 conditions as a requirement of preemption
is weak at best.244 While it is true that the S.E.C. has broad authority to
define the breadth of the term “covered security,”245 the S.E.C. did not
adopt Regulation D for the purpose of defining a class of “covered
securities” to be exempt from blue sky laws. Congress defined “covered
security” to include private offerings subject to preexisting and future
regulatory exemptions.246 However, the S.E.C. tailored Rule 506 to
facilitate compliance with the § 4(2) statutory private offering
exemption,247 not to be a workable litmus test for preempting state
securities law. The S.E.C. has yet even to define sales to “qualified
purchasers,” an entire class of “covered securities,” which Congress
provided specifically for the S.E.C. to define. 248

241

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. 2008) (providing statutory permission for the
Commission to define the term “qualified purchaser” at its own discretion, to mold at it sees fit); 15
U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (allowing an exemption for any Commission rule promulgated under § 4(2)).
243
See S. Rep. 104-293, at 15 (1996) (“The Committee recognizes that the rapidly
changing marketplace dictates that effective regulation requires a certain amount of flexibility.
Accordingly, the bill grants the SEC general exemptive authority under both the Securities Act and
the Securities Exchange Act. This exemptive authority will allow the Commission the flexibility to
explore and adopt new approaches to registration and disclosure. It will also enable the Commission
to address issues related to the securities markets more generally.”).
244
The Sixth Circuit asseverates that the language of NSMIA’s preemption provision best
reflects legislative intent:
242

[F]ar from defining “covered securities” in a manner that generally incorporates all
securities, the SEC has promulgated specific requirements that must be met in order for a
security to be “covered.” Therefore, we hold that NSMIA preempts state securities
registration laws with respect only to those offerings that actually qualify as “covered
securities” according to the regulations that the SEC has promulgated.
Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2007).
245
See Qualified Purchaser, supra note 160.
246
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4).
247
See supra Part III.B.2.
248
See Qualified Purchaser, supra note 160 (seeking comment regarding the definition of
“qualified purchaser,” as used to define a “covered security” under NSMIA).
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THE SAFE HARBOR SOLUTION—IMPROVEMENTS IN EFFICIENCY,
OBJECTIVITY, AND SIMPLICITY

The narrow preemption standard is antithetical to the principles
of efficiency and simplicity espoused by the legislature upon enacting
NSMIA. As discussed above in Part III, federal securities regulatory
policy has always excluded private offerings from the burdensome
registration and mandatory disclosure provisions of the Securities Act.249
Part III.C provided evidence that Congress intended NSMIA to inject
efficiency into securities regulation by assuming exclusive regulatory
authority over private securities offerings.250 Part IV illustrated how the
narrow preemption standard undermines the efficiency of securities
markets and the judiciary by empowering states and state judges to
establish local rules and remedies for unregistered private offerings that
fail the Rule 506 conditions.251 The narrow preemption standard for
private offerings is unreasonable and unsustainable because it reduces
efficiency, adds new complexity to securities law, and provides no
substantial protections for investors.
In order to ensure a national standard that is efficient, objective,
and simple, the S.E.C. should adopt a safe harbor provision for private
offerings of securities. Because courts of several local jurisdictions may
not be bound by each other’s interpretation of NSMIA,252 it is unlikely
that we will see a judicial solution to this problem. The S.E.C., on the
other hand, is given plenipotentiary authority under NSMIA to craft rules
clarifying or defining the preemption standard.253 Section 19 of the
Securities Act of 1933 provides the following:
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter, including rules and regulations governing
registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities . . . .254

Moreover, NSMIA itself added a provision specifically
permitting the S.E.C. to define an entire class of securities for which
state blue sky laws would be preempted:
A security is a covered security with respect to the offer or sale of the security
to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule. In prescribing
249
See supra Parts III.A and III.B; Conference Report on the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, 142 Cong. Rec. S12093-02, at S12093 (Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. D’Amato).
250
See supra Part III.C.
251
See supra Part IV.
252
See, e.g., Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(making an independent determination as to whether an issuer needs to prove exemption before
proving preemption while acknowledging the countervailing authorities).
253
See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006); see also S.E.C. v. Life Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4,
10 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that Rule 506 was the product of the S.E.C.’s exercise of authority to
elucidate the requirements in generating a § 4(2) private placement offering).
254
15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).
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such rule, the Commission may define the term “qualified purchaser”
differently with respect to different categories of securities, consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors.255

Accordingly, the S.E.C. need only draft a rule that is efficient,
objective, and simple, while balancing investor protections.
A broad preemption standard may be tailored as not to diminish
investor protections or promote any fraudulent avoidance of blue sky
laws. While this may seem to be a simple task, the S.E.C. should
recognize that the narrow preemption standard does provide protections
to investors. As discussed in Part IV.B, a broad preemption standard
could permit any issuer to claim the Rule 506 private offering exemption
in bad faith, or even ex post when confronted with a lawsuit.256 As
discussed in Part III.C, Congress had good policy reasons for leaving
regulation of certain securities to the states.257 One option would be to
tailor the definition of “qualified purchaser” to include investors who
purchase securities in a private offering pursuant to rules and regulations
under § 4(2) of the Securities Act.258 Another would be to amend NSMIA
to broaden the definition of “covered securities” to include those offered
pursuant to rules and regulations under § 4(2) of the Securities Act.259
However, these methods fail to avoid the potential abuse for those issuing
securities not intended to be exempt from state regulation under NSMIA.
An efficient safe harbor provision should aim at preempting state
blue sky law for all private offerings of securities, with little left to
judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, an efficient safe harbor provision should
establish a set of conditions for the issuer to meet prior to issuing the securities
in order to establish and provide notice of a bona fide private offering.
Second, the conditions should be couched in objective,
unambiguous terms. Former Rule 146 of the Securities Act was intended
to facilitate compliance with the § 4(2) private offering standard
established in the Ralston decision, but the rule failed because it required
an issuer to determine the extent of each offeree’s knowledge,
information, and business experience.260 An objective safe harbor
provision, on the contrary, should inform the issuer immediately whether
the blue sky law will be preempted with respect to the issuer’s offering,
before a single security is sold.
Finally, the provisions of the proposed safe harbor must be
drafted simply, without complex requirements that would undermine the
255

Id. § 77r(b)(3) (2006).
See supra Part IV.B.
257
See supra Part III.C.
258
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (providing statutory permission for the Commission to define
the term “qualified purchaser” at its own discretion); id. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (currently defining “covered
security” to include those securities exempt pursuant to regulations adopted under § 4(2) of the Securities Act).
259
See id. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
260
See id. § 77d(2); 17 C.F.R § 230.146 (1975), repealed by Exemption Revision, supra
note 79, at 11,251; see supra Part III.A.
256

508

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

purpose of simplifying the dual regulatory system. The safe harbor
provision should not require complex filings or disclosures as a means of
ensuring compliance with the Rule 506 private offering exemption.
Instead, the proposed safe harbor provision should guarantee
preemption once the issuer has (1) filed a Form D notice of sale with the
S.E.C. and the state, (2) indicated on Form D that the securities are
offered pursuant to Rule 506, and (3) issued written notice to the investor
of the anticipated Rule 506 exemption, via private placement
memorandum or otherwise. Such requirements would be efficient
because they would effectively preempt blue sky laws for all bona fide
private offerings. These requirements are objective because they allow
issuers to conclude with certainty that they need not comply with blue
sky regulations and do not involve any subjective inquiry as to the intent
or knowledge of the issuer or investor. Additionally, these requirements
are simple because issuers are already required to file Form D with the
S.E.C., although not as a condition of exemption,261 and some states
already require Form D for certain limited offerings.262
Moreover, the safe harbor would not undermine investor
protection. The Form D filing requirement avoids fraudulent attempts to
escape blue sky laws when issuing non-exempt securities. In fact, the
court in Temple looked to whether the issuer filed Form D as evidence of
a bona fide private offering.263 The written notice requirement avoids ex
post claims of a Rule 506 exemption. The court in Risdall looked to
whether the issuer had indicated in their private placement memorandum
to investors that the securities were offered pursuant to the Rule 506
private offering exemption.264 Finally, those who abuse the safe harbor or
fail the private offering exemption would still be subject to wellestablished federal remedies.265
Martin Fojas†

261
17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2008) (requiring filing of Form D); id. § 230.507 (2008)
(providing punitive measures for issuers who fail to file Form D).
262
See S.E.C., Form D, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2008). The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption permits the filing of Form D for Rule 505 and 506
offerings. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Business’ Search for a “Moderate
Capital”, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 77, 93 (2006).
263
Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding that the information
provided on Form D was evidence that an offer was issued pursuant to the Rule 506 private offering exemption).
264
Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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of the Securities Act).
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